Possibly relying on the prevalence of non-submarine contacts and poor sonar conditions in inshore waters, a submarine may refrain from offensive action until fairly certain that it has been detected and classified. A deceptive use the ship’s sonar intended to disguise the act that the contact is held should be considered. The streaming of decoys under these circumstances will immediately reveal that contact is held.

The mine is one ASW weapon whose potency has been in no way reduced by the increased speed and depth of modern submarines. A submarine operating in inshore waters will be aware of the danger from declared defensive minefields of either moored or ground mines, and accurate navigation is therefore essential. The submarine must also face the possibility of undeclared minefields of the “deep trap” type, where mines are laid in focal areas deep enough to allow the safe passage of surface ships over them but at a depth chosen to catch submarines.

This comes at a time when the Russian destroyer begins new anti-piracy mission off Somalia after North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO) extended anti-piracy operations off Somalia until end 2012.

The French Nivose light surveillance frigate “found, stopped and searched” a suspicious vessel and found that the vessel was a pirate mother ship.

Eleven suspected pirates were arrested and the mother ship was destroyed.